




Introduction: lightness and weight, text and legitimacy
If the French Revolution were to recur eternally, French historians would be less 
proud of Robespierre. But because they deal with something that will not return, the 
bloody years of the Revolution have turned into mere words, theories, and discus-
sions, have become lighter than feathers, frightening no one . . .
In the sunset of dissolution, everything is illuminated by the aura of nostalgia, even 
the guillotine.1
In one short passage, Milan Kundera summarizes how theory, using text as a translational 
medium, evacuates the violence of action. The scenario outlined by Kundera involves a some-
what antiquated transaction where this theoretical translation occurs at a time sufficiently distant 
from the real, lived experience. This temporal spacing is important because text, operating as 
a basis of and for judgment, achieves the clean translation of an experience into an historical 
event. It is significant that the historical event is a type of formalized or ritualized ‘occurrence.’ 
The categorical labeling accompanying the event is essential in transforming a specific experi-
ence into a type or general instance. It matters little if this rationalization of experience operates 
retrospectively to assess actions, or prophetically, to explain contemporary circumstances. In 
both instances, this typology of events creates meaning, and thus judgment, to organize what 
are often experientially inexplicable incidents. The ultimate purpose of this typological ration-
alization is to deprive action of its bloodiness. This relationship between action and interpreta-
tion provides a useful framework to examine the nature of exchange seen in the ideation and 
production of architectural objects.
One of the many salient observations in Kundera’s book is that characters operate in a world 
where the lightness of text does cannot always be relied on to relieve the weight of lived experi-
ence. Using Nietzsche’s concept of eternal return, Kundera demonstrates how the relative value 
of lightness and weight depends on an individuated negotiation of the transaction between 
these terms.2 The book is, after all, a study of the diverse ways in which this transaction occurs, 
illustrating the naivety of representing this exchange as a simple duality. Rather, this exchange 
describes multiple possible interactions that operate through subtle degrees of difference. The 
possibility of variation suggests the textual mediation of lived experience depends on two 
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preconditions. The first precondition is temporal: time creates space between the occurrence 
of lived experience and its subsequent communication as an event. The second precondition 
is formal: text is the preferred medium used to translate lived experience. As with the tempo-
ral spacing associated with the translation of action into text, the form of text is also mutable. 
Theory and critique are equally capable of achieving this transaction. Moreover, the variability 
of both the temporal spacing between action and text and the form of the text means that it is 
possible to manipulate these preconditions to influence the mediation of experience.
The Unbearable Lightness of Being (1995) does more than provide a serviceable analogy to 
evaluate the extent to which theory as text, and design as action, influence the creation, produc-
tion, and assessment of artifacts. The mutability of time and text regulates the exchange within 
and between text and action, and lightness and weight. However, unlike the frank exchange 
Kundera describes between experience and text, architectural design involves a more protracted 
and elaborate exchange. On one level, the processes of ideation and production introduce 
more moments of temporal spacing. This circumstance is further complicated because drawings 
mediate these moments. On another level, design has two distinct experiential consequences: an 
‘embodied experience’ accompanying the making of the object, and the experience associated 
with its reception. The proliferation of temporal spacings and mediums, together with the expe-
riential differences between making and reception, complicate the mediated exchange between 
text, action, and objects. The intricate interrelationship between text, action, and objects means 
that modifying any one of these terms has significant functional and formal consequences.
Architecture’s often fraught relationship to legitimacy traces a deep anxiety over the com-
plexities of mediation.3 Usually, these complexities use text to give a credible account of both 
ideation and architectural objects. If it is given that the price of legitimacy makes the process 
and object subservient to the text, it then seems reasonable to consider what type of exchange 
would occur without the weighty compromises legitimacy brings to the design of objects. 
Plainly, operating beyond text would be pointless. Not only is it just another medium, but text 
is also integral in forming disciplinary judgments upon the worth of its objects. Altering this 
exchange would qualify and modify design by strategically manipulating the temporal spacing 
and the different textual and graphic mediums. The overarching aim of this manipulation would 
be to reconceive of text beyond the legitimization of the object—either in the act of ideation 
and production, or in the performance of objects once in the world. Georges Bataille’s term 
‘l’informe,’ or formless, addresses the problems of legitimacy by inspiring actions that deliberately 
disrupt the mechanisms driving the desire for meaning. Formless deviates from the expectation 
that one gives meaning to things by operating without a commitment to convention or the 
desire to affirm the rhetoric of meaningful production. At the same time, formless requires pro-
foundly structured and targeted strategies. For Bataille this type of deviant philosophy demands 
a type of “discursive reason . . . has the power to undo its [own] work, to hurl down what it has 
built up. Madness has no effect.”4
The weightiness of theory’s ‘lightness’
The act of designing is readily understood as solving the problems posed by the design brief. 
Irrespective of how expansive the ambitions of the brief are, this problem-solution paradigm 
focuses action on singular responses to immediate, ‘worldly’ design issues. However, designers 
are not always satisfied with such a simple exchange. Individual practices ranging across many 
design fields appropriate all sorts of theories to establish a wider social or cultural relevance for 
the artifacts they design. This tendency to exceed the brief testifies to how personal positions 
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and technical conditions first intercede and mediate decisions in the move from ideation to arti-
fact. Underscored by this desire for relevance, the inevitable mediation of artifacts means design 
is not as teleological as the problem-solution paradigm would like it to be.
The design-theory paradigm takes this desire for relevance one step further. Theory’s pri-
mary task is to legitimize design decisions and artifacts even though theory is, initially, peripheral 
to the design act. By attaching the artifact’s legitimacy to theory, text becomes a binding, almost 
ethical, code. Text, being the basis for legitimacy, constricts the design act to producing arti-
facts that evidence theory. In this paradigm, legitimacy allows theory to initiate the process and 
validate the artifact. Unlike the problem-solution paradigm, where design is a sovereign act, the 
design-theory paradigm uses text to trade this sovereignty for what is often a perceptual gift of 
legitimacy. The transformation of theory into a basis for critique allows text to discipline design. 
The ensuing need to substantiate the artifact through the text collapses design and judgment, 
making the design-theory paradigm introspective and self-referential. By containing exegesis 
and judgment within the one textual account, theory’s mediation of design is absolute. Design, 
in turn, can deprioritize the immediate issues peculiar to a design problem. The only require-
ment is that the object gives a good account of theory. It is not just that artifacts must emblem-
atically or performatively embody theory; theory also doubles as the mechanism of critique, 
becoming design’s gatekeeper.
There are a few obvious differences between theory and critique in the design-theory para-
digm. Both use text as their preferred representational medium, and the temporal separation 
between design and the textual account of the artifact operates in the same order. The distinc-
tion between the two is that critique can pass judgment without reference to theory. Critique 
can question the exchange between design and theory by externalizing judgment. This free-
dom to scrutinize artifacts without obligation to theory shifts the nature of the text to create a 
potential for different temporal spacings. In the design-theory paradigm theory, the same text 
brackets the ideation and evaluation of the artifact. Critique has no need to qualify design and 
artifact through the same text, allowing judgment to be more independent and retroactive. 
Unlike theory, which internalizes design and judgment, critique externalizes the design act to 
incorporate more pressing contemporary issues.
In the design-theory paradigm, legitimacy results in theory being used to judge artifacts 
and processes. This textual mediation of designing duplicates the linear trajectory of the type 
described by Kundera in the reference opening this chapter. Initially, at least, this theoretically 
determined critique relieves the act of design of its weightiness. However, this weightiness soon 
reappears, since the artifact has an obligation to the text. The weight of this obligation differs 
from that felt by design in the problem-solution paradigm. Significantly, the artifact’s obligation 
to text has nothing to do with the act of design being a lived experience.
Against autonomy: writing, drawing, and legitimacy
The rise of ‘post-critical’ discourse in architecture during the early 2000s represented another 
attempt to recalibrate the exchange architecture initiates between theory as text, and design 
practice as action. Given the movement’s affinity with the post-theory debate, the term ‘post-
critical’ is somewhat of a misnomer.5 Rather, the ‘critical’ in the post-critical rejects both 
K. Michael Hays’ own ‘critical architecture’ and those design practices emerging from the late 
1960s, that Hays placed under the label of “contemporary architecture theory.”6 The practices 
of contemporary architecture theory rethought the operational role theory played in the idea-
tion, production, and assessment of architectural processes and objects. Contemporary architec-
ture theory altered this circumstance by extending architecture’s theoretical sources to include 




everything from “Marxism and semiotics to psychoanalysis and rhizomatics.”7 Irrespective of 
the discursive ‘flavor’ of the arguments presented over the subsequent years, the source of com-
plaint typically incriminates the combined legacy of Emil Kaufmann, Rudolf Wittkower, and 
Colin Rowe.8 Yet, this attack on architecture as an “abstract formal system” never completely 
disrupted the logics of this earlier architectural theory.9 In this respect, both contemporary archi-
tecture theory and Hays’ critical architecture were deemed deficient for continuing to privilege 
disciplinary autonomy over current societal conditions.10
Historically situated between the early 2000s and the 2008 global financial crisis, the post-
critical sat as a brief but significant moment that reconsidered how one should undertake 
architectural practice. Positioned between digital architecture and the current interest in social 
advocacy, the post-critical approached practice as a pragmatic response to the socio-economic 
and political circumstances of the day. For Michael Speaks, the digital age heralded both new 
technical capacities and conceptual approaches that demanded an innovative, problem-solving 
design approach.11 Unlike digital architecture, the new machines and managerial procedures 
required modes of production that occurred outside the architectural drawing. Robert Somol 
and Sarah Whiting adopted a less instrumental understanding of digital technology. Unlike 
Speaks, the altered socio-economic and political conditions themselves produced a new type of 
experience of being in the world.12
The contemporary social advocacy movement presents itself as a very different mode of prac-
tice. Compared to digital architecture and post-criticality, advocacy dispenses with a positivist 
account of the digital transformation. However, it is of some consequence that this movement 
chooses participatory design methods as the antidote to this change. Like digital architecture and 
the post-critical movement, advocacy’s commitment to addressing the changes brought about 
by digital technology believes in a contextually specific and situated design practice. Despite 
differing design methods and formal repertoires, all three movements believe in the capacity 
of context to reshape the logics of ideation and production. Significantly, this shared faith in 
a contextually relevant mode of architectural production frees objects from any obligation to 
theory. The act of foregrounding the weighty importance of the design act allows the digital, 
post-critical, and social advocacy movements to be recast as a twenty-five-year challenge to 
theory’s lightness.
The privileging of design over the last quarter of a century recalls the sentiment of Foucault’s 
oft-quoted suggestion that theory should act as a “tool-box for users.” According to Foucault:
I would like my books to be a kind of tool-box which others can rummage through to 
find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own area . . . I would like 
the little volume that I want to write on disciplinary systems to be useful to an educa-
tor, a warden, a magistrate, a conscientious objector. I don’t write for an audience, I 
write for users, not readers.13
Foucault’s tool-box analogy resituates theory as something that happens immediately before 
the design act. In this respect, the analogy reorders the sequence between design and theory 
as well as collapsing the spacing between thinking through theory and designing. The integra-
tion of theory into the space of creative action challenges the nostalgic lightness of Kundera’s 
historian by changing theory’s ‘job’ from legitimacy to production. The reassuring aspect of 
Foucault’s ‘theory as tool-box’ analogy is that architecture incites design processes that epitomize 
a more equitable and dynamic engagement between design practice and theory. Crucially, this 
alternative siting of theory reworks the conventional hierarchy in the design-theory paradigm. 
By making theory operative, Foucault recalibrates the basis for critique and judgment. Unlike 
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the normal exchange in the design-theory paradigm, judgment refers not to the text but to its 
capacity to inspire objects that address pragmatic, real-world issues.
The post-critical and advocacy movements have far more similar strategic goals and opera-
tional tactics. While these similarities reflect a continuing commitment to worldly conditions, 
social advocacy prioritizes local, rather than global, conditions. This interest in the local is evi-
denced in the citations for the 2016 and 2017 Pritzker Prize-winners, Alejandro Aravena and 
RCR Arquitectes respectively.14 These accounts are consistent with the type of market-driven 
innovation espoused by Michael Speaks that exploits “the existent but unknown to discover 
opportunities for unpredictable design solutions.”15 Speaks’ emphasis on the market reappears 
when Aravena states that the Quinta Monroy development in Chile ignored precedents; the 
office preferred to study everything “from policy to the building market and the public bidding 
processes, from meetings with the families to site visits, from building codes to budget restric-
tions.”16 However, Aravena’s work operates at the community level, leaving globalization to 
the post-critical movement.
The consistencies between the post-critical and the digital architecture movement are not 
immediately obvious. This circumstance is, in part, an issue of historical fact. Digital design 
practices arose alongside practices that were later assimilated into post-critical discourse. The 
incorporation of practices like OMA (Office for Metropolitan Architecture) into the post-
critical canon suggests the existence of two parallel but formally discrete practices.17 Any com-
monality between the digital and post-critical was obscured by the way in which these discrete 
design practices mediated context. Greg Lynn, the first architect to popularize digital form-
making in the 1990s, was quick to align new digital design methods to key concepts sourced 
from the writings of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze.18 This alignment cumulated in Lynn’s 
animated diagram—a new type of architectural drawing that attempted to simulate the dynamic 
contextual conditions as a mechanism of formation.19 The attraction to Deleuze was under-
standable given the tendency for all “pragmatist philosophers . . . [to] put . . . action, practice, 
and movement at the center of [their] ontology.”20 This reappearance of theory was excused 
because action is believed to be innately congenial to the act of design.
If there is an echo of Deleuzian production within the current dialogue around social advo-
cacy, then this testifies to Deleuze’s disciplinary impact as it first arose in the late 1980s. As 
evidenced in essays by Robert Somol and Michael Speaks, Deleuze’s writings influenced post-
critical discourse. In the 1989 review of Eisenman’s Wexner Centre for the Visual Arts, Somol 
uses Deleuze’s idea of the rhizome to describe the way a project “proliferates within the spaces 
left between [the existing] cultivated areas.”21 Deleuze reappears as a key reference in Somol and 
Sarah Whiting’s 2002 canonical essay “Notes Around the Doppler Effect and other Moods of 
Modernism.” Deleuze also appears in Speaks’ article “Which Way Avant-Garde?” where, after 
initially dismissing Deleuze’s work as outdated, Speaks adds that the real problem is how poorly 
architectural discourse appropriated Deleuze’s work.22 To accentuate the point, one only needs 
to look at the titles of Sylvia Lavin’s essays to see Deleuze’s impact on architectural discourse 
during the 1990s and 2000s.
Digital and post-critical discourse was attracted to Deleuze because his writings super-
seded a theory of meaningful objects with a theory of meaningful production. However, each 
movement arrived at the same position through different arguments. Lynn’s interest in formal 
novelty embodied a deeper dispute with the way in which postmodern and deconstruction 
design methods prevented new disciplinary forms.23 This problem resulted from design meth-
ods that relied on the appropriation and reorganization of lauded disciplinary precedents or 
idealized forms or arrangements of form. At the same time, design makes sense only when 
retaining a semblance of the forms being appropriated. Not only does this design method 
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prefigure form, but the need for resemblance means the new object is a parody of the referent 
form. As Linda Hutcheon outlines in A Theory of Parody (1985), parody can mock or pay hom-
age, but this type of referential exchange in architecture foregrounds a semiotic relationship 
between new and pre-existing forms. Architecture only makes sense when communicating 
through sign and signified.24
Notably, Hays situates critical architecture between the prevailing cultural norms and the 
autonomous formal systems inherited from the likes of Colin Rowe. Critical architecture is 
“resistant to the self-confirming, conciliatory operations of a dominant culture and yet irreduc-
ible to a purely formal structure disengaged from the contingencies of place and time.”25 This 
ability to sit between provided a critical space of action for architecture to resist the politics of 
late capitalism.26 Hays’ critical architecture addressed the paradox at the heart of contemporary 
architecture theory: autonomy relied on texts external to the architecture. This paradox is 
resolved in the practice of architect-theorist Peter Eisenman, who used these external theories 
to disrupt the canon. The problem for the likes of Somol is that critical theory and the practices 
of contemporary architecture theory rely more on text than on real-world issues. From the 
post-critical mindset, both theoretical approaches have a misplaced militancy because both are 
equally dependent on canon.
Crucially, the architectural interest in Deleuzian production paralleled the ‘affective turn’ in 
philosophy.27 Affect Theory, as it came to be known, extended Deleuze’s idea concerning affect 
as a mode of production. A fuller description of affect can wait; it is enough to note that Brian 
Massumi applies Deleuze’s description of affect as an ‘intensity.’28 Massumi, a social theorist and 
leading figure of the Affect Theory movement, turned to Deleuze because semiotics encouraged 
“dumb material interactions of things . . . [that are made] legible according to a dominant sig-
nifying scheme into which human subjects . . . were ‘interpellated.’”29 Text instigates a formed 
conceptual imposition on “what the body knows.”30 This imposition projects predetermined, 
and often ideologically driven, agendas to supplant the embodied cognition one receives from 
being in, and a part of, the world. Affect Theory recasts an understanding of form from a signi-
fier of encultured meaning to an after-effect of the affective conditions from which form emerges. 
The alignment of post-critical discourse, digital architecture, and Affect Theory revolves around 
contextually based production. Digital architecture and post-critical discourse come together 
over the foregrounding of design as a situated, worldly practice.
Undoubtedly, digital, post-critical, and social advocacy practices have divergent accounts of 
context. Of all these accounts only Lynn’s animated diagram expressed affect as a drawn simula-
tion of contextual forces. Lynn’s diagram was unique because it used the animation software 
Maya to represent how a field of forces could modify standard primitive shapes. In compari-
son, post-critical and advocacy practices continued to use text; it merely altered its form from 
theory to critique. By extension, the digital drawing made it possible to avoid the need for text 
during the act of design. History tells us that the animated diagram never became a common 
drawing type. As the initial optimism faded that digital design methods could somehow graphi-
cally replicate contextual conditions of formation, the discipline reverted to soberer, established 
design methods. Post-critical and social advocacy design practices reaffirmed design methods. 
By reinforcing architecture’s established representational modes, the methods also returned to 
familiar material and tectonic arrangements and programmatic types. More significantly, the 
representation of context returned to relying on text alone.
It is timely to return to Speaks’ essay “Intelligence after Theory” and note that “detached 
from its continental origins and replanted in the US . . . [theory] took on a lighter, more occa-
sional existence.”31 The coincidence in terminology between this statement and Kundera’s 
account of theory reveals the great paradox at the heart of “contemporary architecture 
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theory”: that this brand of architectural theory searched for autonomy through sources 
outside the discipline. The difference between these two accounts is that in Speaks’ ver-
sion the violence being erased is the violence theory inflicts on architecture’s objects and 
accompanying processes. With Deleuze, one can renegotiate the exchange between text and 
design. Critique’s interest in contextual, worldly responses reinvests a weightiness to the act 
of designing and the objects it produces.
Procedural autonomy: text
Post-critical discourse highlights two realities architecture faces when using theory to legitimize 
its objects. First, architecture theory is capricious; the discipline resorts to different theories at 
various times. Eisenman provides evidence of this point and, as one of the staunchest advocates 
of autonomy, transferred his theoretical antecedents from Chomsky to Derrida to Deleuze.32 
Second, designers are not always willing to allow theory to orchestrate the design act. Post-
critical practice acknowledged these realities, returning a weightiness to the design act by liber-
ating design from an obligation to theory.
The post-critical negated disciplinary capriciousness by privileging the act of design. The 
tactic was simple; the post-critical refused to allow theory to legitimize the ideation, produc-
tion, or assessment of objects. A potent message of Robert Somol and Sarah Whiting’s “Notes 
Around the Doppler Effect and other Moods of Modernism” is that design should be architec-
ture’s preferred weapon.33 This battle directly addressed the usual exchange expected between 
the design act and text. At the same time, post-critical design practice avoided the trappings of 
the problem-solution paradigm by seeing beyond the client’s brief. Michael Speaks used this 
broader socio-economic and political context to situate a response to the “challenges issued by 
globalization.”34
It is important to reiterate that the post-critical rejection of theory is not so much a problem 
with text but how the text was appropriated. This much is reinforced in Michael Speaks’ arti-
cle “Intelligence after Theory.” Retrieving the term “fast philosophy” from the earlier essay, 
“Which Way Avant-Garde?” (2000),35 Speaks’ argument with ‘contemporary architecture the-
ory’ had little to do with the texts themselves. Though these texts may have lost contextual 
relevance, his primary concern was with the intellectual laxity displayed when the intellectual 
laxity evident when the “French, German, and Italian philosophical tracts that arrived in the 
US in the late 1970s” crossed disciplinary boundaries.36 To this end, it is significant in the short 
article “Critical or Post-Critical” (2002) that Mark Jarzombek states that the post-critical project 
was a “fight for the control of academe.”37 The use of the academy is hardly surprising given the 
influence practice and practitioners have on the nature of education in America. The academy 
was the perfect platform for the then emerging advocates of post-critical thinking. However, 
the decision to use universities as the rightful place to fight for design also saw how essential text 
was in influencing architectural discourse. Even allowing for the pragmatics guiding this deci-
sion, this decision unproblematically accepted that text remained indispensable in mediating the 
translation from idea to object.
Crucially, post-critical thinking initiates more contextually responsive design methods by 
modifying the form of the text from theory to critique. Given critique and theory use text to 
inform and assess processes and objects, the nature and spacing of this exchange resemble that 
found in the design-theory paradigm. In post-critical thinking, this change in the form of the 
text externalizes the text in two ways. First, it is expected that the source text originates from 
outside the discipline. Second, different texts can instigate production and judgment. Critique 





externalizing the design problem such that ideation, production, and assessment of processes and 
objects are no longer ‘bracketed’ by one text or body of writing. Instead, the shift to a problem-
solution model favors a type of critical analysis more commonly associated with cultural studies.
The post-critical externalization of critique does, however, take different forms. Speaks’ 
rhetorical investment in emerging technologies addresses pressing, real-world design issues. His 
notion of ‘plausible truths’ resonates with Deleuzian affect because the focus on innovation 
privileges production more than objects.”38 Somol and Whiting also argue for a projective, per-
formative diagrammatic framework. However, they also suggest that design not only “encom-
passes object qualities (form, proportion, materiality, composition, etc.) but it also includes 
qualities of sensibility, such as effect, ambiance, and atmosphere.”39 Their emphasis on qualities 
contrasts with Speaks’ absolute investment in the inherent value of performance, action, and 
production. Any desire to make the abstract concrete is simply a “negative reduction of qualita-
tive experience to quantification.”40 There is much at stake in this difference between Somol 
and Whiting on the one hand, and Speaks on the other. Whereas Speaks focuses on production, 
Somol and Whiting see affect as an abstract, indeterminate type of experience caused by objects. 
Clearly, Sylvia Lavin sides with this second experiential approach to affect. “The New Mood or 
Affective Disorder” (2000), “Design by Mood” (2011), and Kissing Architecture (2011) do more 
than simply suggest that ‘mood’ can operate as an empirical method of critique.41 These essays 
suggest that it is possible to design an ‘affective’ experience by creating disruptions in the expe-
rience of objects. These disruptions are so profound that they break theory’s hold on how one 
explains such objects. Lavin’s approach to form is not at all concerned with disciplinary continu-
ity or a continuity of experience. Rather, Lavin’s repatriation of Wölffin’s jaded observer in the 
essay “Freshness: In Memoriam, Herbert Muschamp” (2008) makes instrumental a knowledge 
of disruptive objects.42 While not directly acknowledging Walter Benjamin, Lavin is arguing for 
the ‘shock effect’ that comes with new types of objects.43 The type of experience is important—
any understanding of the specific effects caused by new types of objects requires that “criticism 
must now understand sensibility as a form of intelligence.”44
It is worth remembering that Foucault’s tool-box analogy still limits design to a theoretical 
account of the world. Theory still directs design because objects are judged against a view of the 
worldview mediated by theory. The willingness of post-critical practice to source texts external 
to the discipline is, however, a temporary measure by which to avoid the exchange seen in the 
tool-box analogy. Once selected, the texts operate in the same way. It is not just that objects 
must accord to the semantic interpretation of the text. Critique, recast as theory’s proxy, con-
tinues that tradition where text judges both design process and object. As with the tool-box 
analogy, the intimate exchange fostered between theory and design, text and action, allows text 
to be the pre-generator of design decisions.
Foucault’s tool-box analogy intersects with post-critical practice over the latter’s preference 
for production to serve as a basis of disciplinary autonomy. In the first instance, the preference 
for text offers no procedural mechanism for form-making. Nor does disciplinary autonomy 
discipline the selection of text. This is not to say that disciplinarity provides a truth, but it does 
extend individuals beyond personal belief systems. The value of contextually led production 
comes from its immediacy to pressing, worldly issues. Without a sense of any resistance, these 
conditions are assumed to be the natural order of things. Somol and Whiting’s rejection of Hays 
and Eisenman’s accounts of autonomy typify a faith that production is more adept at overcom-
ing neoliberal thinking than Marxist resistance.45 They share Michael Speaks’ faith that the 
capitalist ideals of production, competition, and entrepreneurship offer a “fresh, and ideologi-
cally smooth” design approach.46 This unshakable optimism in action demonizes resistance as 
being negative and unproductive. The demonization of resistance precludes the possibility that 




resistance can be contextually strategic. This acceptance of production counters claims that the 
design of affect is not a “capitulation to market forces.”47 Disciplinarity is not valued because it 
conveys truth, but because it provides a basis by which to critically scrutinize claims and find 
alternative ways to intercede in the design act.
Deprived of explicit mechanisms of production or scrutiny, the right to pass judgment 
requires an acquiescence to the dispensation of disciplinary authority. The term ‘acquiescence’ 
is important because such authority is granted through social privilege. The absence of theory 
shifts disciplinary authority further into the obscure, privileged realm of social relationships. 
Arguments of the sort made in “The Doppler Effect” demonstrate how a paranoia with critical 
disciplinarity substitutes scrutiny for the word of the expert. There is no option here: one must 
believe Somol and Whiting’s claim that Robert Mitchum’s performative ease is preferable to the 
labored theatrics of Robert De Niro’s ‘method acting.’48 Without consensus around the basis for 
judgment and an absence of a procedural framework, the design of affective experience becomes 
a rhetorical exercise. The curation of affects reintroduces authorship, where design mastery 
confuses the production of atmospheric effects with affective production. Ultimately, affective 
production turns the design of affects into the staging of effects.
Procedural autonomy: drawing
The development of computational design processes during the 1990s coincided with a broader 
disciplinary rethinking of architecture’s relationship to broader societal changes. Like post-critical 
discourse, autonomy was rejected in the digital because of the limited capacity for past design 
methods to address all sorts of natural or fabricated contexts.49 Lynn’s books Folding in Architecture 
(1993), Animate Form (1999), and Folds, Bodies & Blobs (2004) led the way by searching for 
design methods that moved beyond the formal limitations of semiotics. The problems of semi-
otics encompassed the predilection for contradiction, fatigue with “linguistic constructions,” 
and a concern with “ideology of postmodernism.”50 Turning to Deleuze, Lynn used the digital 
toolset to counter how the prefiguring of form in semiotic design methods limited architecture’s 
agency.51 Architects Reiser & Umemoto echoed this sentiment, suggesting that architecture had 
been more concerned with “judgment and asking what the thing is, which has been the domi-
nant mode of questioning in contemporary practice from approaches as divergent as histori-
cal postmodernism, deconstructionism, and critical practice.”52 Deleuze’s theory of production 
circumvented the semiotic concern with meaningful objects by focusing on the conditions of 
formation. To quote Lynn: “The move from . . . meaning to machine, is a necessary shift . . . 
if one is to tap the potential of abstract machines such as computational motion geometry and 
time-based, dynamic force simulations.”53
Lynn’s discursive genius lay in merging key Deleuzian concepts of the virtual with the 
formal possibilities of the digital toolset. Deleuzian virtuality provides a different concept of 
form from that established by semiotics. For Massumi, semiotics is prejudiced because it con-
structs an “entire vocabulary . . . from theories of signification that are still wedded to structure 
even across irreconcilable differences.”54 Using the term ‘real-but-abstract,’ Massumi describes 
Deleuzian virtuality as a condition of “pure relationality, the interval of change, the in-itself of 
transformation.”55 These conditions of formation are real given they can be said to be in the 
world, but also abstract, being without fixed and explicit form.56 Deleuzian abstraction differs 
from modernist methods of figural erasure because it is not interested in transcendental, essential 
form. Rather, the real-but-abstract nature of the virtual describes a field of pure potentiality.57 
An object is an after-effect of affect, a “residue of a process of change, from which it [the object] 
stands out.58
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As previously argued, the digital differs from post-critical and social advocacy by using the 
drawing rather than text as the primary medium by which to translate affect. Eric Shouse’s useful 
summary of affect in “Feeling, Motion, Affect” (2005) demonstrates how much easier it is to give 
a textual description of this term. The beauty of text is that it tends to operate retrospectively.59 
Design does not have this luxury, because design must produce things. As Robin Evans argues 
in his seminal essay “Translations from Drawing to Building” (1997), architectural production is 
problematic because it is one of the most heavily mediated design practices.60 This circumstance 
is a consequence of the size and complexity of architectural objects, which makes it practically 
impossible to design without drawing objects to scale. Without saying as much, Evans identifies 
how scale makes the architectural drawing a space of profound transformation. In architecture, 
the projective demands placed on design meant that the digital’s absolute investment in the 
drawing was not without risk. Digital practice attempted to ameliorate this risk by positing 
the digital drawing as a workable simulation of the conditions sponsoring form.61 Simulation 
escapes semiotics because, representationally speaking, the form of the final architectural object 
is “inchoate”; it “emerges from the process, derivative of a movement that exceeds it.”62 Digital 
discourse attempted to solve the problem of semiotics by relating Deleuzian virtuality to the 
‘virtual’ space of the computer. In this respect, Lynn’s animated diagram was a fundamentally 
different type of drawing. In fact, Lynn’s diagram represented a radical deployment of Evans’ 
call “to use the transitive, commutative properties of the drawing to better effect.”63 By avoid-
ing the act of re-presenting objects according to established formal tropes, Lynn posited digital 
form as an after-effect of an authentic mode of production. To achieve this quality, the animated 
diagram exploited two newfound capacities of the digital drawing. The first capacity involves 
an argument for novel form, while the second alters the categorical understanding of form from 
typologies to taxonomies. Formal novelty embraced the rhetoric of production to propose an 
avant-garde practice without the ideological failings typically apportioned to early modernism. 
Process avoids avant-garde idealism through a capacity to simulate real-world processes.
If ideology resides in an ability to control what the object signifies, then the provisional 
nature of the generative drawing removed ideology by making it difficult to author form. The 
added capacity to recalibrate the drawing to modify and adjust the final object was equally 
as important, because form making became a question of variability and permutations. An 
autonomy based on formal types prefigures form, making objects symbolic or emblematic. 
The generative diagram reset the formal knowledge of architectural objects from typologies to 
taxonomies. Jeffery Kipnis refers to Lynn’s processes as a formal manifold where the classifica-
tion of objects occurs as families rather than idealized antecedents.64 Herein lies the significance 
of Lynn’s essay “Variations on the Rowe Complex” (1994).65 Attacking autonomy through 
Colin Rowe, this essay refutes the definition of the modernist diagram as a signifier of an ideal 
type. Lynn’s diagram freed objects from a priori logics of any favored theory, inspiring a mode 
of judgment where critique focuses on a facility for production. If the formal mutability of the 
animated diagram comes close to the weight Kundera apportions to lived experience, then the 
operation of the digital toolset as a manifold makes drawing digitally a site of what Kundera 
might refer to as Nietzschean return.66
John Rajchman’s Constructions (1998) provides a formal analogy through which to under-
stand the virtual. Through Rajchman, the virtual is “a world that is disunified, incongruous, 
composed of multiple divergent paths . . . that . . . are quite real, even though they are not 
actualized.”67 This precondition of form contextualizes philosopher Andrew Benjamin’s claim 
that the drawing is “a melancholic space.”68 The formal recycling seen in semiotic appropria-
tion uses the drawing as a site of “attempted recovery or overcoming of loss.”69 The challenge 
issued to semiotic design methods embodies a fundamental shift in the architectural drawing 
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away from illustrations of the already known towards processes of selective production. The 
use of digital space to simulate form making resets this ‘melancholic space’ toward production. 
This resetting of the drawing is important, because when “the incomplete is viewed as a mark 
of production then the incomplete has its own generative capacity.”70 If one equates paths with 
lines, Rajchman’s formal description of the virtual recasts digital design as a method to select 
lines from these multiple divergent paths. In the first instance, these lines are representationally 
abstract, but the digital toolset can inform the drawing “surface . . . in a particular transformable 
and deformable manner.”71
Lynn’s alignment of digital design practice to the Deleuzian virtuality was made possible 
by using the animation software Maya to mimic the type of formal production that comes 
when contextual forces deform and transform matter. Significantly, Lynn’s opportunistic use of 
Maya in Animate Form forged a new type of architectural drawing where matter was animated 
and distorted according to forces either embedded in or external to the standard geometric 
primitives sourced from the modeling menu. In certain projects, Lynn collapsed force and form 
into the one entity. Architectural form resulted from skinning the collective volume described 
by the interaction of multiple primitives as they moved through the project site. The site was a 
more abstract affair in the projects that separated force and form. In these projects architecture 
resulted from the way in which an animated field of deforming contextual forces transformed a 
more complex initial form modeled from the standard primitives.
To the uninitiated eye, the standard primitives in Maya are similar to the geometric figures 
used in the past. The distinguishing aspect of Lynn’s animated diagram was that it fundamentally 
altered how one produced formal complexity. Previously, formal complexity relied on additive 
and subtractive techniques. Generally, the resulting objects bore the trace of the procedural 
figures used to produce architectural form. Lynn’s use of Maya, when coupled with the often-
opaque secondary design decisions used in the tectonic articulation of the object, obscured any 
resemblance between procedural form and the product of that process. In Animate Form, Lynn’s 
use of Maya as a generative toolset was important in presenting the animated diagram as the 
“interaction of a multiplicity of abstract statements, [where] signifiers emerge in a more dynamic 
manner than mere representational effects might.”72 The idea that signification was something 
that comes after the production of the architectural object required form initially to have a non-
symbolic matter-of-factness. As implied by the term ‘abstract statement,’ the standard primitives 
used in the process had no shared cultural or disciplinary lineage. The animated digital drawing 
allowed one to understand form as procedural material rather than an encultured semiotic figure.
Maya made it possible for the first time to draw form as being a consequence of emer-
gent, non-material, contextual forces. As the term ‘matter’ suggests, the representation of the 
transformative capability of dynamic contextual forces to shape new and novel architectural 
forms required one to rebrand the role of form in the drawing. Using Deleuze’s notion of the 
‘asignifying’ concept, Lynn divested form of any encultured meaning. By making any form in 
the process merely one of many components and non-formal forces within the drawing, Lynn 
changed drawn form into a representation of matter.73 Borrowing another of Deleuze’s terms, 
‘abstract statement,’ the appearance of form in the animated diagram became merely a function-
ing component within a ‘machinic,’ generative digital process.74
There is no shortage of those willing to argue for the unique value of the topological geom-
etry found in most computer modeling software. For Massumi, this is a geometry where “form 
emerges from the process, far from enclosing it.”75 In the essay “Notes on the Line” (2013), 
Benjamin argues that topological spline lines generate form that “is no longer presented as 
disjunctive but conjunctive.”76 The geometric pliability of conjunctive form also gives lines 
an abstract representational openness such that “the [computer] screen allows for architecture’s 
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materiality to be investigated.”77 Irrespective of these advantages, the drawing is still only a rep-
resentation of the dynamic processes operating in the physical world. Digital architecture, like 
Affect Theory, may well validate artifacts by using movement as the guiding principle of pro-
duction. In Affect Theory, movement establishes an embodied knowledge that comes from the 
body being in, or part of, the world. The paradox of embodied knowledge is that its resolution 
of Descartes’ mind-body model simply inverts which of these two terms should be privileged. 
Lynn’s animated diagram may come as close as is possible to simulating this type of embodied 
production. The value of simulation is that it evacuates authorship by providing a clean trans-
mission between drawing and object. Architectural objects may well resonate with the embod-
ied lived experience of what occurs when working on the screen. They might equally produce 
certain types of embodied atmospheric conditions. However, the animated diagram remains 
only a representation of the world as a complex and sophisticated interrelated contextual simula-
tion. Scale haunts architectural production, frustrating the ambition that artifacts might be able 
to encapsulate a truly uneffected, affective mode of production. The uncertainties of mediation 
only increase when architectural drawings attempt to engender experience. Drawings mediate 
both the physical experience of designing as well as the artifacts they envision. Scale ques-
tions whether an architectural simulation of context is nothing more than a sign of Deleuzian 
affect. This circumstance is problematic given “affect in the Deleuzian sense is asubjective and 
anti-representational.”78 Any hint of representational artifice questions the claim of procedural 
authenticity. Faced with these uncertainties, it is unsurprising that architects willingly trade the 
object’s sovereignty for text’s gift of legitimacy. The representational slippages that are part of 
every mediated translation from drawing to object compromise the notion of indexical fidelity 
and thus the possibility of representing a clean mode of production.79
The digital process shows the difficulty of overcoming the mediating effects of scale. It isn’t 
only that reliance on text makes Affect Theory better at retrospective analysis of an action or 
actions. There is little difference in whether precedent or process generates form. The ideali-
zation of movement and process returns the interaction of text and action to the conventions 
implied in Foucault’s semantic theory. Any claim of authenticity tends to restore the importance 
of text. The idealization of production in both digital discourse and Affect Theory negotiates 
the process-artifact relationship through a textual accordance to a specific theory. The return 
of Affect Theory is, inescapably, a return of theory. Herein lies the paradox of the architectural 
appropriation of Deleuze’s theory of production: theory still legitimizes design.
The last twenty-five years have witnessed a concerted effort to remove the formal effects of 
text through the rhetoric of situated, real-world production. This type of production attempted 
to collapse the space between design, as an action, and formal mediation of that action. The 
post-critical and social advocacy movements based judgment on a critical response to a textual 
description of contextually specific design issues. The digital avoided objects altogether, allow-
ing critique to fix judgment to the process. In all three cases, production disentangles judgment 
from a critique of the object’s capacity to embody theoretical concepts. Production effectively 
separated design on one side; and theory, judgment, and critique on the other. Different tactics 
have been used to entreat the ‘real,’ but these tactics ultimately make design reactive to text. The 
inability to escape text is explained by Hardt and Negri when arguing that Deleuze and Guattari 
did not describe the constituent parts of affective formation: “the creative elements and the 
radical ontology of the production of the social remain insubstantial and impotent.”80 Massumi 
attempts to address this issue, but ultimately Affect Theory is also trapped in a fundamental para-
dox: any ability to sponsor production is to effect affect. Knowledge of formation and production 
comes through reflection; it arrives retrospectively to what has just passed. Clearly, Hardt and 
Negri identify that Deleuzian thinking does not automatically provide a projective mechanism. 
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Irrespective of the temporal shifts and subtle changes in form, the exchange between design and 
text remains stubbornly the same.
Repetition and Bataille’s “l’informe”
Andrew Benjamin, in Architectural Philosophy: Repetition, Function, Alterity (2000), suggests that, 
while “the complex movement of historical time” ensures that the functional requirements of 
architecture are repeatable, their final formal expression is not.81 This emphasis on the varia-
tion of function over time reveals the disciplinary inevitability of disruption.82 The thought that 
architecture should expect formal difference replicates an admittedly banal anecdotal observa-
tion that the broader community expects architecture to furnish unique solutions to specific 
design problems. A significant proportion of architecture’s social largesse, both from within and 
external to the discipline, relies on the production of objects that exceed the immediate, prag-
matic concerns of the design brief. The expectation of something additional means that architects 
work beyond a simple ‘problem-solution’ paradigm.
The desire to mitigate theory’s influence on design is not the same as arguing for its com-
plete erasure. The sublimated idealism behind production merely expresses that knowledge 
always forms. The question behind the exchange between theory and design concerns how 
artifacts are altered by adjustments in the function and judgment of a specific process. Theory’s 
return requires an intellectual reconciliation between its lightness and the weight it bestows 
upon the embodied experience of designing and a lived experience of built objects. Elizabeth 
Grosz approaches such a reconciliation when she writes there is no value in the “eternal status 
of truth, or the more provisional status of knowledge . . . [but in] highly provisional or short-
term effects . . . [that] may continue to be read for generations.”83 Grosz raises an interesting 
idea. No matter how explicit theory is, the affects constructed over time indicate the limits of 
authorship. Obviously, one still requires strategic responses to theory’s return. Here, Deleuze’s 
notion of repetition as “a necessary and justified conduct only in relation to that which cannot 
be replaced” is useful.84 because return focuses not on the meanings of things but rather on the 
mechanisms by which things are exchanged. Deleuze notes:
Repetition as a conduct and as a point of view concerns non-exchangeable and non-
substitutable singularities. Reflections, echoes, doubles, and souls do not belong to the 
domain of resemblance or equivalence; and it is no more possible to exchange one’s 
soul than it is to substitute real twins for one another. If exchange is the criterion of 
generality, theft and gift are those of repetition. There is, therefore, an economic dif-
ference between the two.85
Grosz is more inclined to initiate the type of economic exchange that Deleuze calls ‘theft’ or a 
‘gift.’ The notion of repetition assumes that equivalency is not possible—there is always a sense of 
loss. The subtle difference between a commercial exchange and the logics governing theft or the 
gift is revealed in Rajchman’s permissiveness to formation. This permissiveness rejects critique 
on the basis that one must transgress “a supposed order or paternity” until one has the courage to 
refuse “to affirm new possibilities through a virtual construction that says ‘yes’ as well as ‘and.’”86 
Rajchman’s naturalization of design is as logically untenable as it is problematic. Naturalization 
eliminates a basis for critique of the process or final object. These seamless, ‘smooth’ design acts 
do not entertain deliberate disruptive political acts.87 Grosz provides a mode of production with-
out resorting to Rajchman’s autonomy of pure production. Instead, Grosz observes:
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[T]exts could . . . scatter thoughts and images into different linkages or new align-
ments without necessarily destroying them. Ideally they should produce unexpected 
intensities, peculiar sites of indifference, new connections with other objects, and thus 
generate affective and conceptual transformations that problematize, challenge, and 
move beyond existing intellectual and pragmatic frameworks.88
Grosz expands the usual framing of Deleuzian thinking by including text within the logics of 
production. When text asks how a process can ‘act’ critically, the basis of a critical return arrives 
in the procedural expression of the artefact. Grosz’s quote actively encourages a disruptive mode 
of return that incorporates how production occurs and performance is measured. Grosz avoids 
treating artifacts as a mode of linguistic representation, while simultaneously identifying the 
disruptive capacity of knowledge. Artifacts, as either text or objects, no longer result from the 
cessation of movement; instead, they are contingencies of action.
The credibility of the post-critical project rests with rejecting theory as a basis for design 
decisions and critique. This position responds to the capacity of text to preside over or at the 
beginning of the design act. At the same time, the development of the disciplinary knowledge of 
form and process insists on some return of theory, critique, and judgment. If theory is a “scheme 
or system of . . . statements held as an . . . account of a group of facts,” then what is required is 
an intellectual shift away from theory as fact.”89 In Peter Eisenman’s introduction to Anthony 
Vidler’s Histories of the Immediate Present: Inventing Architectural Modernism (2008), Eisenman argues 
that Vidler’s “idea of a posthistory . . . implies that there is a limit to every discipline.”90 This 
limiting, or what Eisenman terms ‘bracketing,’ offers the possibility that theory has performa-
tive and experiential consequences. Eisenman’s concession to post-criticality’s argument with 
autonomy comes by a tacit acceptance that one must discard theory’s status as an absolute truth.
Andrew Benjamin offers a second counter-argument to Rajchman’s procedural autonomy in 
the first chapter of Architectural Philosophy. The larger objective of this book is to reconcile disci-
plinary autonomy with Deleuzian production by erasing the distinction between difference and 
repetition. Benjamin uses these terms within the single schema, arguing that architectural design 
differs from other design disciplines through programmatic repetition and formal variation. 
Alterity, meaning “the possibility of otherness,” involves the interplay between time and func-
tion that causes a condition of repetition that guarantees a difference in form.91 Each design act 
deals with “the nature of already existent relations . . . [where the] already present—the inscrip-
tion of the given—is the operation of repetition.”92 Judgment is allowed to avoid the disciplinary 
nostalgia of precedent form because precedent “reinforces the ascription of loss.”93 Precedent is 
only valuable by its refusal to duplicate the already built. Importantly, alterity modifies Deleuze’s 
notion of difference and repetition by adding a way to assess difference. Not only does Benjamin 
combine the generative capacity of the toolset with a disciplinary knowledge, but critical judg-
ment operates retrospectively. If every new formal expression of program is contextually situated, 
then it is the history of these interactions that makes a critical discussion of the object in context 
possible. The value of precedent lies in the way in which program intersects with all types of 
physical and social contexts. More importantly, alterity is a relational, taxonomic knowledge that 
allows the design act to sit outside disciplinarity; it neither dictates what or how form is pro-
cessed. Alterity, instead, folds critique into design through the appreciation of the material effects 
of lived socio-cultural, economic, and political consequences of past programmatic incarnations. 
It allows design to operate before artifacts are positioned relative to the field. Judgment, operating 
through a rich array of critical frameworks, avoids formal predetermination while identifying the 
‘placed-ness’ of architectural artifacts as a basis for a projective disciplinary practice.




Grosz’s inclusion of text into the design act, together with Benjamin’s comparative evalua-
tion of alterity, place a value on the potentially disruptive effects of text. There are, of course, 
operational differences: Grosz’s basis of judgment makes text affective, while Benjamin’s uses 
it for to determine disciplinary differences. However, both locate critique within the space of 
ideation. The inclusion of text within the design process is neither a validation of design through 
theoretical rectitude or design for design’s sake. The operative dimension of text recalls, in fact, 
Georges Bataille’s notion of “l’informe,” which is ‘defined’ in the following way:
A dictionary begins when it no longer gives the meaning of words, but their tasks. 
Thus formless is not only an adjective having a given meaning, but a term that serves 
to bring things down in the world, generally requiring that each thing have its form. 
What it designates has no rights in any sense and gets itself squashed everywhere, like 
a spider or an earthworm. In fact, for academic men to be happy, the universe would 
have to take shape. All of philosophy has no other goal: it is a matter of giving a frock 
coat to what is, a mathematical frock coat. On the other hand, affirming that the 
universe resembles nothing and is only formless amounts to saying that the universe is 
something like a spider or spit.94
Bataille’s work is a theory in the sense that it is a “conception or mental scheme of something to 
be done, or of the method of doing it.”95 Bataille’s work takes an alternative or deviant trajec-
tory to the interplay between text and action. It differs from Foucault’s ‘tool-box’ or a theory of 
production, because it is an epistemological system directing an action against meaning—his is a 
theory of actions against theory. The intellectual consistency in Bataille’s project against mean-
ing is evident as he slips between expository, descriptive, persuasive, and narrative forms of text. 
The shift between textual forms is purely operative; it’s designed to have affects. The value of 
Bataille’s “l’informe” is not that it establishes a conceptual rule set to determine how to design, 
but because it is a theory of disruptive action.
Andrew Benjamin links “l’informe” to the digital toolset because, as a new representational 
venue for Deleuzian abstraction, it avoids prefiguring form.96 Benjamin references Plato’s khora 
to locate the generative function of “l’informe” within the moment of ideation and formation.97 
While disciplinarity is the basis of critique that makes design operative as well as generative, its 
status in the process is less certain. Alterity combines difference and repetition but the former 
arrives through production, while the latter arrives with a critical judgment of disciplinary vari-
ation. Critique returns to give an account of the artifact while form making remains an open 
space of production. In this scheme, critique sits both outside and over the design. Benjamin’s 
text is nuanced such that the relationship between difference and repetition is not sequential. 
The staging of design and critique may shift between that of procedural oversight and as a 
comparative tool of analysis and assessment. However, the more significant implication of this 
schema is that critique’s job is primarily concerned with the artifact more than legitimacy.
Rosalind Krauss and Yve-Alain Bois’ reading of “l’informe” alters Benjamin’s sequencing of 
design and judgment; “l’informe” is “[n]othing in and of itself, the ‘formless’ has only opera-
tional existence: it is a performative, like obscene words, the violence of which derives less 
from the semantics than from the very act of their delivery.”98 Delivery is vital because affect 
comes from artifacts situated in the world. Design, as a projective act, still approaches the artifact 
through a critical awareness of the affects that are effected by difference. Like Benjamin, Bois 
and (by implication) Krauss establish the contingency of the ‘real’ as a valid departure point 
while acknowledging the value of temporality and relativity. They also tacitly accept that mean-
ings are always being exchanged and contested. However, action here involves an undoing of 




meaning. The operative dimension of action is applied not to the space of ideation but to the 
reception of the artifact. Bois and Krauss exploit the representational gap between the form and 
meaning of the sign. While their application of “l’informe” operates as a disruption to the estab-
lished theories surrounding modern art, this understanding of artifacts is transferable to design. 
Thus, Formless: A User’s Guide (1997) represents the most compelling example of how a deviant 
theory of action achieves the operative undoing of the social and cultural processes and forms 
that mask deeper transcendent ideologies. The resistance to semiotic closure rejects the repre-
sentational process of theoretical ideation in the move from meaning to form. Bois and Krauss 
identify and exploit the fundamental weakness of semiology by challenging existing figurative 
structures, where communication involves a clean semiotic transfer between sign and signified.
Bois and Krauss’s use of “l’informe” does nothing to prevent the designer and critic from 
being two separate individuals. The value of their reading is that it embraces Bataille’s antago-
nism to any monolithic intellectual construct. The operational undoing of meaning does not 
distinguish between the form of communication and the form of the artifact. It is possible to 
disrupt all procedural and communicative modes of representation. Benjamin’s approach to 
“l’informe” differs from Krauss and Bois in that “l’informe” sits within the process of idea-
tion, whereas Krauss and Bois turn their attention to the reception of the artifact. The focus 
of critique on the object as a contextual response occurs in the act of design, thus reducing 
the temptation to have design and critique work independently. The capacity for critique and 
design to work together dispenses with the need for theory to be a semantic rule set, where 
the textual form of theory and critique collapses, allowing the “universe . . . to take shape.”99 
Obviously, critique, as a reaction to the ‘real,’ acts as a tool of assessment that is at the service 
of design. Unlike theory, where legitimacy restricts design, the negotiation of the actual has no 
need for a set of rules to interpret the world. This critical functioning allows form to operate 
beyond the polemics of the ‘critical’ object because the ensuing objects are not representations 
of an argument, but instead attack the symbolic and performative requirements placed on form.
Conclusion: design-based research
Kundera’s writing typically avoids definite answers. When asking “which one is positive, weight 
or lightness,” Kundera introduces the reader into a space between extremes; a space between 
experience and text, lightness and weight.100 His protagonists collectively exemplify the range 
of inversions and inflexions that populate how individuals might negotiate the movement from 
experience to theory. Of course, Kundera focuses only on the movement between action, 
event, and text.
Robin Evans makes it impossible to argue that architectural drawings are natural or faithful 
indexical representations. The difficulty with architecture is that assessment, both during and 
after the design act, requires judgment through these modes of representation. Design-based 
research only exacerbates this problem because a desire to legitimize the object often uses text to 
see past or through the medium or the operational or formal consequences of the process. At the 
same time, the ‘job’ of representation is also to propagandize process and artifact. The ‘creative’ 
repatriation of the rhetoric only makes ethical sense when employed within an ethos of experi-
mentation that imitates a mode of production that operates to disrupt the dogma constructed 
around architecture’s diverse range of theoretical and critical positions. Disciplinarity reappears 
here only if there is an ethical commitment to experimentation. The ethics of experimentation 
explain why critique must sit above the theoretical predetermination of form.
If theory’s traditional role removes the problem of representation, then it comes at the cost 





representational mediation of the artifact away from a quest for legitimacy. In this paradigm, the 
incorporation of text and image into the process comes through different, but connected, modes 
of communication. The inclusion of drawing and text as critical and generative tools refuses the 
notion that images and drawings are less sophisticated than text. If theory alone cannot drive 
design, then design should not be presented as the sole agent acting within the drawing or arti-
fact. Instead, drawings and text can operate as valid modes of communication and as productive 
components of design. The disciplinary validation of processes and artifacts no longer depends 
on procedural fidelity, but on a willingness to investigate how individual processes solicit certain 
types of artifacts. The design act resists meaning by willingly playing with, and perhaps even 
abusing, text. The call for disciplinary judgment, found in the work of Grosz, Benjamin, Krauss, 
and Bois, is vital in appreciating how critique allows for alternative and even deviant artifacts. In 
this sense, deviation restores weight to both theory and design.
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